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Abstract
Early philosophical accounts of explanation mistook the function of boundary
conditions for that of contingent facts. I diagnose where this misunderstanding
arose and establish that it persists. I disambiguate between uses of the term
“boundary conditions” and argue that boundary conditions are explanatory via
their roles as components of models. Using case studies from fluid mechanics and
the physics of waves, I articulate four explanatory functions for boundary
conditions in physics: specifying the scope of a model, enabling stable descriptions
of phenomena in the model, generating descriptions of novel phenomena, and
connecting models from differing theoretical backgrounds.
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1 Introduction
I want to begin with an old joke. It goes: A physics student is taking a history test and
is asked to identify two causes of World War I. In the essay space on the test paper, the
student writes, “The universal wavefunction, and the initial and boundary conditions of
the universe.”
That is the end of the joke. The joke is that the student is mistaken in thinking that
if one could specify the universal wavefunction—that is, the fundamental dynamical law
of the physical universe—along with the set of happenstance conditions that determine
the shape and distribution of the stuff to which the fundamental law applied at the first
instant of the universe, then one would have a means of specifying every successive state
of the universe, including those contemporaneous with a multinational war on Earth. It
is not a particularly good joke, but it is one that educators, physicists, historians, and
philosophers of science have all passed among themselves over the years.
I find the joke amusing for reasons that have less to do with the misapplication of
physics to history and more to do with the conceptions of physics embedded in the
student’s response. I find it funny, or at least foolish, that the student hastily groups
initial and boundary conditions together as a single cause of the war. This is an unusual
place to locate the humor in the joke, for, as I will discuss below, many philosophers of
science have made the same grouping over the years. My aim in what follows will be to
show why this is a misguided approach to understanding the explanatory roles of initial
and boundary conditions in physics.
Specifically, my aim here is to show that boundary conditions play a more significant
role in physical modeling and explanation than the student’s division would suggest. To
2
D
RA
FT
do this, in Section 2 I first establish two central tenets of the historical view, which are
tacit in much historical work on explanation in physics and which have stubbornly
persisted to the present day. These are that boundary conditions and initial conditions
play interchangeable roles in scientific explanation, and that more explanatory work is
performed by lawlike relations than by either initial or boundary conditions. Next, in
Section 3 I diagnose an ambiguity in the use of the term “boundary condition” in the
philosophical literature. In Section 4 I use case studies from fluid mechanics and wave
physics to articulate four explanatory functions of boundary conditions: to specify the
scope of a model, to enable stable descriptions of phenomena in the model, to generate
descriptions of novel phenomena, and to connect models from differing theoretical
backgrounds. Section 5 contains brief concluding remarks.
2 Two Persistent Theses About The Explanatory
Role of Initial and Boundary Conditions
In the joke, the student’s response generates a binary division between the universal
wavefunction, on the one hand, and the initial and boundary conditions of the universe,
on the other. This division is common and long-standing one in the philosophy of
science. It has an evident origin in Hempel’s initial presentation of his
deductive-nomological (D-N) theory of explanation. (Hempel 1942) In the D-N view,
explanations and predictions are deductions carried out over two types of statements:
universal hypotheses, and determining conditions. Universal hypotheses are general laws,
and the determining conditions are, in a sense, everything else: they are statements that
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hem in the specifics of an event such that it is possible for a universal hypothesis to
apply to it. Hempel occasionally refers to the information contained in statements of
determining conditions as information about the causes of a specific event; one can
imagine him giving the physics student full marks.
The vocabulary of “determining conditions” is, in Hempel’s philosophy, more widely
applicable than that of “initial and boundary conditions,” which is restricted to the
physical sciences. (Hempel 1942, p.36) The function of initial and boundary conditions
in physical explanation is indicated via his discussion of the role of determining
conditions in scientific explanation more generally. In Hempel’s account, determining
conditions are causal, and they link universal hypotheses to a hypothetical “complete
description” of an event, which would specify all of the properties predicated of the event
(p. 37). In their canonical presentation of the D-N view, Hempel and Oppenheim
(Hempel and Oppenheim 1948) exchange the vocabulary of “determining conditions” for
“antecedent conditions”, and they specify that while a scientific explanation cannot be
considered logically adequate without a general law, it is possible to conceive of adequate
explanations consisting solely of general laws; that is, without antecedent conditions (p.
137). Clearly, laws play the leading explanatory role in the D-N account.
There are three central themes in the D-N analysis of initial and boundary conditions
that are worth highlighting. First, initial and boundary conditions are the type of
antecedent condition that is native to physics. They are, jointly, one subcategory of a
more general category of condition type in the D-N account. Second, initial and
boundary conditions play one sort of role in generating scientific explanations, while
general laws play a different sort of role. Third, the sort of role that initial and boundary
conditions play is a causal role.
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Together these themes imply two theses about the explanatory role(s) of initial and
boundary conditions in physics under the D-N view. I shall call these the Hempelian
theses about initial and boundary conditions. They are,
(1) there is no difference worth noting between the explanatory roles of initial
conditions and those of boundary conditions, and,
(2) laws play the more central of the explanatory roles, relative to initial and/or
boundary conditions.
That the D-N view subscribes to the first thesis is evident from the lack of distinction
between initial conditions and boundary conditions as types of antecedent conditions in
physics, as well as in the indiscriminate attribution of a causal role to both. That the
D-N view subscribes to the second thesis is apparent from the logical conditions of
adequacy in the canonical account. Its roots are also evident in the naming conventions
Hempel chose for the initial presentation: the article is about the function of general
laws, not the function of determining conditions, and the account Hempel develops has
“nomological” in its very name.
I want to impress the point that these theses are not mere quirks of the D-N account.
The role of laws of nature in scientific explanation, and in science more generally,
became a central subject of analysis for philosophy of science throughout the 20th
century. In addition to deductive accounts of explanation that followed the D-N
archetype (e.g. Braithwaite 1955; Nagel 1961), prominent theories of explanation that
reacted to problems in these accounts (e.g. Achinstein 1971; Kitcher 1981; Salmon 1984)
also tended to emphasize the role of laws in explanations—whether that role was logical,
unificatory, causal, or otherwise. Even the canonical pragmatic account of explanation
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(Fraasen 1980), while deeply critical of the structure of explanation espoused by earlier
accounts, concludes that “theory” and “fact” are two of the three relata in an adequate
scientific explanation. Contemporary causal-mechanical accounts (e.g. Woodward 2003)
de-emphasize the role of laws per se but still regard generalizations as a central subject
of analysis. At the same time, literatures have arisen on ceteris paribus laws, laws and
idealization, and whether laws govern or describe their target systems (e.g. Dretske 1977;
Cartwright 1983; Earman, Glymour, and Mitchell 2003; Lange 2009). The corresponding
literatures on determining conditions, and on initial and boundary conditions in physics,
are comparatively scarce. This disparity demonstrates the historical impact of Thesis (2).
A particularly telling instance of the persistence of the Hempelian theses can be
found in a contemporary argument by Jeremy Butterfield on the underdetermination of
theory by evidence in cosmology. After proposing a hypothetical explanation of the
cosmological principle, Butterfield analyzes the adequacy of the proposed explanation
scheme. While his analysis of the explanation is fascinating, the details of his account
are not important here. What is worth noting, instead, is the appearance of both
Hempelian theses in one short passage and its footnote. Butterfield writes, “The physical
idea is a bit more specific, though also independent of theory. It is that initial conditions
are a matter of mere happenstance, in some sense that a theory’s laws (in particular:
equations of motion) are not.” (Butterfield 2014, p.64) An extensive footnote is
appended to this passage, part of which reads, “I have stated the idea in terms of initial
conditions: as is usual, and as suits our cosmological discussion. But one can, and some
authors do, state the same idea for final and-or boundary conditions.” (p. 64n14.ii)
Thesis (1) is evidenced in the text of the footnote that follows the in-text passage
(reproduced above with braced asterisks). Thesis (2) underwrites the attribution of
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“mere happenstance” to initial (or boundary, or final) conditions and not to laws.
Similarly, in a recent piece on the role of symmetries in non-causal explanations in
physics, Steven French and Juha Saatsi introduce their argument in the following
manner:
“[W]e will argue that various symmetry explanations can be naturally captured in
terms of a counterfactual-dependence account in the spirit of Woodward (2003),
liberalized from its causal trappings. From the perspective of this account symmetries
can function in explanatory arguments by playing a role (roughly) comparable to a
contingent initial or boundary condition in causal explanations: a symmetry fact (in
conjunction with an appropriate connection between that fact and the explanandum)
can contribute to provision of what-if-things-had-been-different information.” (French
and Saatsi 2018, p. 185, emphasis original)
It is apparent that French and Saatsi’s view is that boundary conditions play an
equivalent explanatory role to initial conditions (Thesis (1)), and this role contrasts with
the explanatory role of laws. Further, their description of boundary conditions as
contingent facts underlines their subscription to the usual contrast drawn in accounts of
explanation between laws and facts. It does not imply that they subscribe to Thesis
(2)—indeed, the focus of their account is on the explanatory role of contingent
symmetry-facts—but it emphasizes the persistence of the division witnessed in this
essay’s opening joke. My aim here is to demonstrate that, whether or not some version
of that division is a useful one to draw in constructing a theory of explanation in physics,
interpreting the explanatory work performed by boundary conditions as equivalent to
that performed by merely contingent facts mistakes the role of boundary conditions in
physical modeling and, consequently, in physical explanation. Below, I develop an
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alternative account by identifying four distinct explanatory roles played boundary
conditions in physical explanation, none of which map neatly onto the explanatory
functions typically ascribed to particular contingent facts. In so doing, I will in passing
distinguish the explanatory role of boundary conditions from that of initial conditions.
3 What Boundary Conditions Are
In order to explicate the explanatory role of boundary conditions, it is necessary to
clarify a few points about what boundary conditions are. In this section, I consider the
origin of the concept of a boundary condition in mathematical modeling in physics,
identify how philosophical use of the term has departed from this origin, and offer
reasons to return it whence it came. I summarize some useful philosophical theorizing on
boundary conditions that has come from considering the mathematical concept, and I
show that such considerations have been steering toward analyzing boundary conditions
as components of models, rather than as contingent facts about a system. The upshot of
making this distinction will be that once boundary conditions are understood as
components of models, philosophical work on how models explain can be applied to
accounts of how boundary conditions explain.
In physics, the term “boundary condition” is used to denote a particular sort of
component of some mathematical models. In particular, boundary conditions are
specified sets of values that a differential equation must take at the boundary region of
the problem’s solution space. Boundary conditions are typically associated with
boundary-value problems, a type of differential-equation problem that is commonly
solved in order to model a diverse array of physical phenomena including fluid dynamics,
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heat diffusion, electrostatics, and acoustics. This usage of the term “boundary
condition” is distinct from, but historically related to, the way that the term was
introduced to the philosophy of science, where, as discussed above, “boundary condition”
was used to refer to something like a Hempelian determining condition that occurred
within in the domain of physics.
Amidst the progress in philosophical analysis of scientific explanation that has taken
place during the 75 years since Hempel’s initial theorizing about determining conditions,
this residual ambiguity between the physical and the philosophical meanings of
“boundary condition” has contributed to continued misunderstanding of the explanatory
role of boundary conditions. Since the term originates in the mathematics of physics,
and since its meaning there is both better-specified and has been the subject of more
extensive theorizing and modeling, it seems evident that the philosophical usage of the
term should be revised to conform to the mathematical usage. This suggestion has
recently been made as well by both Mark Wilson (2017), who simply takes the
mathematical concept as a point of fact, and by Jeffrey Sykora (2019), who argues that
defining boundary conditions by contrast with laws does not align with the historical
and present use of the concept of a boundary condition in physics. Below, I draw from
these accounts to argue that boundary conditions are components of explanatory models,
rather than contingent facts. I then employ recent philosophical analyses of how models
explain from Margaret Morrison (1999, 2015, 2018), Alisa Bokulich (2008, 2013, 2017),
and Angela Potochnik (2017), in order to orient this alternative view in the literature on
explanation.
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3.1 Boundary Conditions are Not Not-Laws
A commonly-discussed boundary condition in contemporary philosophy of physics is the
slip condition, which is used in the modeling of viscous fluid flow via Navier-Stokes
equations. The slip condition is the mathematical representation of the tangential
component of the velocity of a fluid at the surface of a flow along a stationary boundary,
e.g. the surface of contact between the water flowing through a straw and the straw
itself. It is represented by the expression u× n, where u stands for the fluid velocity and
n is the normal to the solid surface.“No-slip” refers to setting the value of this expression
to 0, meaning that the tangential component of the fluid’s velocity is 0, i.e., that the
fluid is stationary at the edge of the flow.
In his analysis, Sykora shows that the no-slip condition (1) is invariant under certain
classes of intervention, (2) is broader in scope than mere contingent facts, and (3) enjoys
significant empirical and theoretical support. He argues that these aspects of what he
calls the “epistemic role” of the no-slip boundary condition allow it to function more like
a law than like a contingent fact in explanations of fluid flow. Coupling this analysis
with study of inlet/outlet conditions on fluid flows, he develops a contextual approach to
the question of the relation between laws and boundary conditions, arguing both that
the distinction is fuzzy and that there are more lawlike and less lawlike applications of
boundary conditions in physics. This contextual approach problematizes Hempelian
Thesis (1).
Sykora’s project builds on analyses of fluid-mechanical models from Morrison (1999,
2015), Robert Batterman (2001), Alex Reuger (2005) and others. Common to all these
analyses is a robust accounting of the mathematical structure of physical models of fluid
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behavior, accompanied by argument for the essential role that such structure plays in
modeling or explanation. Sykora follows a similar approach in articulating the epistemic
role of boundary conditions in fluid modeling. However, neither Sykora’s account nor
many of the other studies on fluid mechanics sufficiently address the notion that
boundary conditions are components of models and that, as such, there is alternative
philosophical infrastructure available for analyzing the explanatory role(s) of boundary
conditions.
Morrison (1999) is an exception to this trend, as she discusses at length the relation
between setting the boundary condition relevant to slip and the development of
boundary-layer models for fluid flow. Modeling flows with slip requires the addition of
boundary-layer models, and the representational and explanatory requirements of this
more complicated modeling scenario are among Morrison’s central concerns in her
account. Morrison ultimately concludes that the explanatory capacities of the models
she considers are a function of their representational capacities, but along the way she
notes that the need to represent the slip condition in order to model some fluids suggests
the need to generate a phenomenological boundary-layer model, which in turn “explains
the behaviour of the system because it contextualises the laws in a concrete way.”
Morrison attributes the contextualization of laws to the boundary-layer model in her
analysis; using an acoustic case study below, I will argue that such a contextualization,
which I will call the scope-setting role of a model component in an explanation, is at
least sometimes properly attributable to the boundary condition itself.
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3.2 Boundary Conditions are Components of Models
Morrison’s analysis explicates how boundary conditions work in the development of
models to guide epistemic activities associated with those models, particularly
representing and explaining. Sykora also notes that the no-slip boundary condition is
“representational in the sense that [it] represent[s] physical boundaries in the world,”
(Sykora 2019, p. 24) which implies that he views boundary conditions as able to take on
representational capacities of the sort typically ascribed to models or parts of models.
Moreover, in physics, boundary conditions simply are components of mathematical
models. This is a very different epistemic or explanatory category than “contingent
fact.” It imports very different associations regarding what we expect boundary
conditions to tell us about the systems they associate with, and how we expect them to
do the telling. Facts invite questions about truth, falsehood, and evidence; models invite
questions about representation, idealization, structure, and scope. Philosophers have
overlooked the explanatory role of boundary conditions by asking the wrong questions;
the model-driven questions are the ones we should be asking when we ask about how
boundary conditions function in scientific explanations.
Conceiving of boundary conditions as components of mathematical models assists in
clarifying an additional dimension of the confusion that has persisted in the
philosophical literature. When authors have employed the term “boundary condition” in
the sense of a contingent fact, what they are typically referring to — and, quite
explicitly, what Hempel was referring to — is the specification of values of variables
within a model. This variable-fixing is a particular sort of epistemic activity that should
be understood as distinct from the epistemic activity of specifying the mathematical
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structure of the boundary condition. Consider slip once more: there is a difference
between specifying that slip is the tangential component of fluid velocity at the surface
of the flow, on the one hand, and setting that tangential component to 0 (or any other
value), on the other. To put the point another way, recognizing the relationship that
expresses the boundary condition on the flow as v × n (structure-specifying) is distinct
from setting v × n = 0 (variable-fixing).
Wilson offers a particularly evocative description of boundary conditions through the
structure-specifying lens in a passage about modeling a cracked billiard ball as a
boundary-value problem. (Wilson 2017, pp. 35–36) In the discussion, he distinguishes
the differential equations describing the behavior of the interior material of the billiard
ball from with the mathematics describing the interfacial behavior of the ball, arguing
that “a canny modeler must somehow crush [the] rich array of surface region data into a
comparatively coarse package to reach a proper inferential accord with the interior
equations. The end result is a situation where the physical data pertinent to a target
system are codified according to distinctly different recipes.” (p.36)
I want to make four observations about Wilson’s analysis. First, Wilson’s “canny
modeler” is specifying structure, not fixing variables. Second, in the lead-up to this
analysis on pp. 35–36, Wilson takes pains to describe the complex reasoning processes
that underlie the specification of that structure, describing the mathematical strategies
taken to bring the interior and surface models into accord. Third, that description is a
description of mathematical modeling techniques, rather than an articulation of
contingent facts. Fourth, Wilson juxtaposes his analysis with contemporary
philosophical work on multiscale modeling. Taken together, the first three observations
provide additional support for the notion that explicating boundary conditions in the
13
D
RA
FT
structure-specification mode is a rather different philosophical project than explicating
the role of contingent facts in scientific explanation. The fourth observation draws
attention to the link between philosophical analysis of boundary conditions and of
modeling. That link, I believe, requires further investigation.
It is a blunt fact that boundary conditions on differential equations are a recognizable
component of certain mathematical models in physics, just as squiggle-covered capsules
are a recognizable component in models of cellular structure (representing mitochondria),
or as dots around letters are recognizable components of Lewis-structure models of
chemical bonding (representing valence electrons). Morrison, Sykora, and Wilson have
all theorized about boundary conditions in relation to structure-specifying. I believe this
stems from their shared, though largely tacit, recognition that boundary conditions are
components of models. As such, boundary conditions function like many components of
models: they can be representational, they can have internal structure, they can contain
idealizations, and so forth. Both Morrison and Sykora have written more extensively on
the role of boundary conditions in representation, but relatively little has been said
about how boundary conditions function in explanation qua components of models;
while Wilson’s analysis draws nearer, explanation as such never enters his discussion.
When the notion of a boundary condition was introduced to the explanation
literature, very little philosophical ink had been spilled on the role of models in
explanation. Happily, this is no longer the case. Recently, philosophers including
Morrison (1999, 2015), Bokulich (2008, 2013, 2017), Potochnik (2017), and Batterman
and Collin Rice (2014), have offered accounts of the role(s) of models in scientific
explanation. While there are important differences between these accounts, a conclusion
they share is that if a model is to play a role in explanation, (i) some accounting must be
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given of how real or true insight may be obtained out of idealizations or fictions that the
model employs, and (ii) that fulfilling (i) generally involves some sort of appeal to the
model’s ability to capture important aspects of stable, reliable patterns of phenomena.
For instance, in Bokulich’s view, one condition that must be met for a model to
explain an explanandum is that the model, in its capacity as an explanans, “show[s] how
there is a pattern of counterfactual dependence of the relevant features of the target
system on the structures represented in the model.” (Bokulich 2008, p. 226) Relatedly,
in Potochnik’s account, explanations employ “causal patterns,” which are depicted by
idealizations in models (Potochnik 2017). Earlier, Morrison makes a similar point, using
the vocabulary of dependencies rather than patterns: “The reason that models are
explanatory is that in representing [certain physical] systems they exhibit certain kinds
of structural dependencies. The model shows us how particular bits of the system are
integrated and fit together in such a way that the system’s behaviour can be explained.”
(Morrison 1999, p.63) Likewise, Batterman and Rice contrast their view with
representation-driven accounts of how models explain, yet still develop an account of
minimal-model explanations based on an answer to the question of “in virtue of what
[minimal models] are able to explain universal patterns across diverse real systems.”
(Batterman and Rice 2014, p. 350) To put the consensus plainly: somehow or other,
models are explanatory through their ability to instantiate patterns.
Recognizing that models are explanatory via their pattern-instantiating capacity is
key to recognizing the explanatory function of boundary conditions: boundary
conditions, in their role as a particular sort of model component, enable the instantiation
of important patterns of physical behavior in models. This is a strict logical relation
applicable to mathematical modeling in physics: without boundary conditions, many
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differential equations (and all those used to solve boundary value problems) are
incomplete expressions. Without boundary conditions on differential equations, those
pieces of mathematics could not function as mathematical models of physical systems,
because the mathematics itself would be a no-go.
This logical relation further encodes a variety of conceptual relations between what is
modeled in the interfacial region of a physical system and what is modeled in the interior
of that system. Taking the example of slip, it is impossible to generate a model of fluid
flow from the Navier-Stokes equations without specifying what happens to the tangential
component of the fluid’s velocity at the walls of the pipe. It is also the case that
specifying the the boundary condition on a mathematical model often has ramifications
for the interior behavior of a system. For instance, a partial-slip system will exhibit a
greater rate of flow than a no-slip system with otherwise identical conditions.
One final comment is required before moving on. I suspect that the continued
philosophical usage of the term “boundary condition” to mean “a class of contingent
fact” arises from a desire to refer to the sort of epistemic activity I identified above as
“variable-fixing.” Being able to identify variable-fixing as an epistemic activity is likely
useful in the context of discussions of divisions between theories and facts, or laws and
facts, or generalities and particularities, or other similar divisions that the opening joke’s
physics student might endorse. However, this usage trades on a potentially pernicious
category mistake: Specifying the values of variables is something that one can do in a
boundary condition, in a governing equation, or in any number of other parts of
mathematical models of physics. Without additional context provided, it is of course a
matter of contingent fact what the particular values of a flowing fluid’s pressure and
density are, but filling in those values is an activity that occurs in the application of the
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governing equations (here the Navier-Stokes equation) to a particular situation, not in or
about a boundary condition. To invoke “boundary condition” in this variable-fixing
manner is to mistake the contingent properties of materials in physical modeling for the
boundary conditions on those models.
4 Four Explanatory Functions for Boundary
Conditions
The discussions in the previous section sum to the idea that boundary conditions, in
their capacities as components of models, play a critical role in enabling the generation
of patterns in mathematical models, and the philosophical literature on models and
explanations provides good reason to suspect that these patterns in turn play an
important role in generating explanations in physics. This gloss on the explanatory role
of boundary conditions in physics is a significant departure from the standard
philosophical view of boundary conditions as a variety of contingent fact in physics. My
aim in this section is to substantiate this initial gloss by articulating four specific ways in
which boundary conditions contribute to the generation of explanatory patterns in the
models in which they are components. I will call these the (a) scope-setting, (b)
law-stabilizing, (c) phenomena-generating, and (d) model-connecting functions of
boundary conditions. I will explicate them through an analysis of the physics of waves,
which I employ as a supplement to the discussions of fluid mechanics and cracked billiard
balls above.
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4.1 The Physics of Waves
Partial differential equations and boundary value problems regularly appear in the
modeling of waves, and the modeling of waves appears across a wide variety of
subdisciplines of physics, from acoustics to seismology to optics and fluid mechanics.
This wide applicability makes wave physics a good venue for investigation on the
explanatory roles of boundary conditions in physics. Furthermore, in wave mechanics,
the explanatory roles of boundary conditions in the model can be seen even without
recourse to the wave equations themselves, making the example a particularly accessible
one. Here I describe some basic features of the physics of waves and a particular
application of wave physics: explaining the acoustics of violins.
Waves may be either traveling, wherein a pulse propagates along a medium, varying
its position in space over time; or standing, wherein important spatial features of wave,
known as its nodes and antinodes, remain fixed in space (See Figure 1). A particularly
well-known example of standing waves occurs in acoustics, where vibrating strings and
air columns produce the heard tones of musical notes; standing waves also occur in lasers,
river flows, seismic phenomena, and mechanical resonance. Different mathematical
models are used for traveling waves than for standing waves. Traveling waves are
modeled with wave equations in which vertical displacement is expressed as a function of
time, horizontal position, amplitude, wavelength, and frequency. Standing waves, on the
other hand, are modeled with wave equations in which vertical displacement is expressed
as a function of time, horizontal position, amplitude, frequency, length of the vibrating
body (I will consider a vibrating string below), and harmonic ordinal. The
standing-wave equation is a solution to the traveling-wave equation.1
1The equations of motion for a traveling wave are,
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The physics of these two classes of phenomena, and the mathematics of these two
classes of models, are distinct but closely related. A common and intuitive explanation
of the relationship between traveling and standing waves is that standing waves may be
understood as the sum of two traveling waves of identical velocity and phase, moving in
opposite directions along the same medium. These two component waves interfere with
one another, and because the waves are identical save their direction, the interference is
constructive: the amplitudes of the crests and troughs are doubled, rather than canceled
out by one another, as they would be if the component waves were not in sync. In
physical systems, many standing waves genuinely evolve in this manner from traveling
y(x, t) = A sin
2pi
λ
(x− vt) (1)
vy(x, t) =
dy
dt
= ωA cos
2pi
λ
(x− vt) (2)
ay(x, t) =
d2y
dt2
= −ω2A sin 2pi
λ
(x− vt) (3)
where y is vertical displacement, x is horizontal position, t is time, A is amplitude, λ is
wavelength, v is the wave velocity v = λν, and ω is the angular frequency ω = 2piν.
For a standing wave, the equivalent position equation is,
y(x, t) = A sinωnt sin
npix
L
(4)
where L is string length and n is the harmonic ordinal as described in the main text.
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Figure 1: Comparison between a traveling (top) and standing (bottom) wave. Top: The
grey dot indicates the progress of a single wave crest along the length of the line. Bottom:
The white dots indicate stable nodes in the standing wave. Author illustration.
waves that initiate motion in a localized position on the medium, although it is possible
to directly transmit standing waves across media.
Two further points about standing waves are necessary for the present discussion.
First, it is impossible to generate a standing wave in a medium with an indefinite or
changing length, and without at least one fixed end. Fixing the end of the medium forces
the energy generated by the wave to be reflected back into the system once it encounters
that unmoving boundary. If the endpoint were not fixed, that is, if it moved around, the
wave would dissipate on impact with the boundary via destructive interference. Rather
than the lossless reflection of energy through a fixed point that produced the standing
wave, reflecting a wave through a moving boundary will demolish the standing wave
through destructive interference and dissipative exchange with the environment. Further,
conservation-of-momentum principles dictate that waves, whether traveling or standing,
will flip their pulse (that is, move from positive to negative vertical displacement, or vice
versa) upon contact with a fixed boundary.
Second, the harmonic ordinal n is a particularly important parameter in the
modeling of standing waves. It can take positive integer values, and it specifies whether
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a particular standing wave has the lowest frequency supported by the medium,
second-lowest, or so on. A given vibrating medium can only support certain frequencies,
and thus certain wavelengths, of standing wave. For instance, a vibrating string of length
L can only generate standing waves with wavelengths of 2L/n. 2 Especially in acoustics,
n = 1 is known as the fundamental tone or first harmonic, and n = 2 and higher are
known as the medium’s harmonics, referred to by ordinal (n = 2 is the second harmonic,
n = 3 is the third harmonic, and so on). In music, harmonics are so central to theory
and composition that they comprise their own chapters in many tutorial books. There is
even a musical notation symbol for the playing of a note to emphasize a particular
harmonic, a technique popularized in the 1700s and which is common notation in
contemporary compositions (Vincent 2003, p. 10).
2The relation between medium length and harmonic ordinal assignment differs depend-
ing on whether one or both endpoints of the medium are closed (Closed boundaries are
distinct from fixed boundaries). In the main text I consider only strings, whose harmonics
are identical with open-ended tubes. Tubes that are closed at one end support harmonics
under the relation λ = 4L/n for odd n only; even n does not produce harmonics in such
systems. Whether a pressure wave is produced in a tube with an open or a closed bound-
ary affects which pattern of harmonics it produces, but it does not affect the fact that
the standing wave is produced via reflection through an unmoving, unchanging, reduced-
dimension boundary point at the end of the vibratory length of the system. Thanks to
Robert Mullen, Michael Stoelzner, and Eric Winsberg for stimulating conversations on
this subject.
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4.2 Three Explanatory Functions
These technicalities provide sufficient detail to see the following point: in modeling
waves, to specify that the medium has a definite length and that the system has at least
one fixed endpoint is to specify boundary conditions on the system. The traveling-wave
equations of motion says nothing about what happens when a wave encounters the edge
of the medium in which is propagating; instead, as described above, conservation
principles external to the wave equation dictate that when a wave reaches the end of the
medium, if the end is fixed, the wave will be reflected back with a flipped pulse. If not,
the wave will dissipate through the motion of the medium’s edge in interaction with its
environment, as well as through destructive interference with the portions of these
dissipated waves that reflect along the length of the medium. Holding the endpoint fixed
adds an additional component to the model of the system, and this addition enables the
generation of new patterns, specifically the patterns modeled by the standing-wave
solution to the wave equation.
Recognizing the specification of a fixed endpoint as a boundary condition in the
model of a standing wave enables two philosophical observations. First, it provides
another illustration of the distinction I drew above between the variable-fixing and
structure-specifying modes of understanding the explanatory role of boundary
conditions. In the variable-fixing mode, the question of whether a given system is fixed
or mobile at its endpoint is merely a contingent fact about the system, but in the
structure-specifying mode, fixing the endpoint generates a pattern of further conditions
upon models of the system’s behavior accessible only through standing-wave modeling.
This latter function builds to the second observation, which is that boundary conditions
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enable the application of certain classes of model to a system. This furnishes the first
explanatory function of boundary conditions:
• Boundary Conditions Set the Scope of Models. Specifying boundary
conditions can limit the scope of a model to a limited subclass of systems to which
a set of governing equations applies. Examples include fixing endpoint on a
vibrating string in order to access standing-wave models and setting a no-slip
condition on a fluid flow.
It is widely recognized that specifying scope is a precondition for building
explanations, and most of the accounts of model-based explanations referenced above
address scope-setting explicitly. For instance, in her account of how models explain,
Bokulich has argued that model-based explanations in particular require a “justificatory
step,” in which an explainer “specif[ies] what the domain of applicability of the model is,
and show[s] that the phenomenon in the real world to be explained falls within that
domain.” (Bokulich 2008, p.226) In cases like slip and endpoint-fixing, changing the
boundary condition changes the scope, or domain of applicability, of the model. It also
changes what model is being used within the scope, e.g. from a traveling-wave model to
a standing-wave model, which generates further restrictions on how an explanation is to
be constructed. In Bokulich’s terms, would-be explainers will have to perform different
demonstrations to show that a phenomenon falls within the domain of a standing-wave
model rather than a traveling-wave model.
I have given the scope-setting example in terms of fixing the endpoint on a wave
medium, but the same point holds for setting a definite length on the medium. Modeling
a wave as moving through a medium of a fixed length, as opposed to an indefinite or
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variable length, generates new information about the system by restricting the
possibilities for what happens at the system’s edge. This occurs in two ways: (1)
modeling a traveling wave as moving along a medium of length L indicates where a given
wave’s vertical displacement (and velocity and acceleration) will be when it reaches the
edge of the medium, provided the starting location of the wave is known, and (2) the
fact of there being a definite L indicates that there will be certain wavelengths for which
constructive interference is possible, as well as indicating that if the system were to
evolve a standing wave, its first harmonic would be at wavelength 2L/n.
Specifying that the medium has definite length and fixed endpoints enables the
application of the standing-wave model in the scope-setting manner identified above, but
it also provides an illustration of the second, related explanatory function of boundary
conditions. By generating rules about what happens at the edges of models, boundary
conditions enable the stable application of governing equations to the interior behavior of
a system.
• Boundary Conditions Enable Stable Descriptions of Lawlike Behavior.
Through specifying what occurs at the edge of a modeled system, boundary
conditions enable the production of stable descriptions of the system’s interior
behaviors.
This is the explanatory function of boundary conditions that Wilson indicated in the
passage above, in which he described the “reasoning advantages” obtained by the
application of differential equations to model the behavior of solids. This reasoning
advantage is an instance of the titular phenomenon in the book from which the passage
was drawn: Wilson’s Physics Avoidance. “Physics avoidance” is Wilson’s
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characterization of the combination of idealizations, abstractions, and tools of
mathematical reasoning (e.g. variable reductions, renormalizations) that comprise the
strategy of systematically ignoring certain details of physical systems in order to obtain
stable descriptions of patterns of behavior. Imposing boundary conditions on models of
physical systems enacts this physics-avoidance strategy in a notable way, namely by
parameterizing away certain particularities and details of the complex behaviors that
occur at the edges of physical systems. This parameterization is necessary for producing
models capable of describing patterns of behavior at all: if every detail of a physical
phenomenon were required to be represented in a model, the familiar and lamentable
chaos of over-subscription to detail would ensue.3
Returning to the wave example, fixing the endpoints of the wave medium is what
gives rise to the conceptual possibility of any standing wave whatsoever, as well as to the
possibility of a flipped wave pulse. If the endpoints of the medium move around, then
there is no opportunity for the reflection of a wave: as discussed above, the wave will
dissipate due to energy loss through an open boundary. It is impossible to access the
system’s harmonics, and any explanations they generate, without including fixed
endpoints as a component of the wave model. To put the point another way, without
fixed boundaries on the motion of a wave, there is no possibility for a standing wave to
be generated. The wave equation only dictates how a wave will propagate. Because the
3While many philosophers have written about the disadvantage of such approaches to
modeling, none have done so as eloquently as Jorge Luis Borges, whose one-paragraph
short story “On Exactitude in Science” describes cartographers constructing ever-larger
models of geographic regions until constructing a “Map of the Empire whose size was that
of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it.” (Borges 1998).
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very concept of a standing wave entails a notion of reflection through a fixed boundary,
standing waves are strictly features of a system with fixed endpoints. Without fixed
endpoints, the notion of a standing wave ceases to make sense, like a circle without a
circumference, a mountain without a valley, or death without life.
This explanatory function of boundary conditions has been gestured at before,
notably in Nancy Cartwright’s (Cartwright 1999) account of “nomological machines.”
Cartwright’s machines are systems consisting of a “fixed (enough) arrangement of
components, or factors, with stable (enough) capacities that in the right sort of stable
(enough) environment will, with repeated operation, give rise to the kind of regular
behaviour that we represent in our scientific laws.” (p. 50) In her view, these systems
give rise to the conditions that permit scientists to observe lawlike behavior and apply
nomological reasoning to draw inferences and generate theories. Consequently, in her
account, Cartwright’s nomological machines perform the same sort of sanctioning as I
am suggesting here that boundary conditions do: like nomological machines, boundary
conditions on models in physics specify regions where the laws will apply (Function 1)
and enable laws to produce stable descriptions of interior behavior (Function 2).
Both the scope-setting and law-stabilizing functions of boundary conditions serve as
logical preconditions on the construction of model-based explanations that appeal to the
equations of motion in mathematical models, no matter whether one interprets those
equations as laws, governing equations, or mathematical or causal regularities. The third
function of boundary conditions concerns their ability to generate new phenomena that
can serve as explanantia in such explanations.
• Boundary Conditions Generate Phenomena. Placing boundary conditions
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on a model of a physical system can produce novel phenomena that cannot be
predicted from or explained by equations of motion alone.
In the fluid-mechanical case discussed earlier, specifying whether slip occurred in a
modeled system enabled the application of Navier-Stokes models to explanations of a
system’s behavior. In cases where slip occurs, specifying slip did not necessarily end an
explanatory or modeling investigation. Instead, slip itself became a target for the
construction of models and explanations. This is the origin of Prandtl’s boundary-layer
models in fluid mechanics, which Morrison has argued is an importantly
phenomenological set of mathematical models in physics (Morrison 1999, pp. 53–54). By
this she does not mean to draw a contrast with theory, but rather to emphasize that the
Prandtl models were constructed specifically to generate the ability to represent,
examine, and explain the particular phenomenon of the flow of a thin boundary layer at
the edge of a bulk fluid flow. Prandtl initiated development of the boundary-layer model
in response to the mathematical intractability of the Navier-Stokes equations in
instances where the boundary condition specified partial slip.
Analogously, in wave physics, the stable nodes and relations among harmonics in
standing waves are phenomena that are inaccessible from the equations of motion of
either traveling or standing waves alone. They appear only through the specification of
the boundary conditions on a standing wave (determinate length and fixed endpoints),
and the harmonic relation in particular has become a subject of mathematical and
physical investigation in its own right. It has given rise to an entire branch of
mathematics, namely harmonic analysis, which includes the techniques of Fourier
analysis and can be applied to problems in optics, condensed matter, and quantum
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mechanics, as well as synaptic behavior and tidal modeling.
I call attention to these theoretical investigations on boundary phenomena not for
their own sake, but to emphasize that such phenomena exist and have been initially
noticed through the specification of boundary conditions. Further, it is not uncommon
for explanations of the sort that appeal to the mathematical models in which conditions
are a component to appeal, also, to such phenomena. For instance, explanations of the
mathematical relations among harmonics typically appeal to the location of nodes along
the length of the medium, using geometric reasoning to rationalize why nodes appear in
certain locations on the medium and not others. Setting the acoustic boundary
conditions generates new phenomena that can be used in the construction of
explanations in acoustics. In this way, boundary conditions broaden and change the
available explanatory landscape.
4.3 A Final Function: Coordinating Models
The final explanatory function of boundary conditions is somewhat distinct from the
first three, because it considers the role of boundary conditions not only within a
particular model, but as a means of generating conceptual, mathematical, and
explanatory bridges between models in multi-model explanations:
• Boundary Conditions Coordinate Multi-Model Explanations. Through
the parameterization of messy edge phenomena, boundary conditions are able to
facilitate the exchange of information among different mathematical models from
different theoretical backgrounds in the construction of explanations that draw on
multiple modeling frameworks.
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This function of boundary conditions is best explicated through a more extended
example. In wave physics, an important class of explanations of acoustic phenomena
arise from questions like, “Why does a violin sound like a violin?” In order to answer
this question, acoustic physicists employ not only models of the sound waves produced
by the instrument(s) in question, but also models of the methods of production of those
sound waves, i.e., of the structure of the violin. In violins, audible tones are produced
when the violinist generates a resonant vibration in one or more of the instrument’s
strings. Vibrations in the string produce vibrations in the bridge, which which is the
thin piece of wood that raises the four strings away from the body of the instrument.
Vibrations in the bridge are then transmitted to the instrument’s body through the bass
bar and the sound post (See Figure 2). This induces vibrations in the sound box, that is,
the hollow in the wooden body of the instrument, which amplifies the sound and
transmits it into the air. Most acoustical study of sound production in violins centers
around questions of the relationship between the instrument’s components, the materials
from which they are made, and the wave energy loss associated with each stage in the
transmission process described here.
When a violinist draws her bow along a properly-tuned open A string, her bow
induces a vibration in the string. In the first instants of the string’s excitation, the bow
produces traveling waves at a variety of frequencies, which propagate down the length of
the string. However, as per the strictures of wave physics discussed above, only certain
frequencies will persist through reflection at the fixed endpoint of the string, and only
these frequencies participate in the resultant, resonant vibration, which is recognizable as
a standing wave in the string. That standing wave occurs at a fundamental frequency of
440.0 Hz, creating a sound wave with a wavelength of approximately 78 cm.
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combination of fundamental and harmonic tones produced by the particular bowing or
plucking of that particular string and transmitted through the materially contingent
resonance chambers in the violin’s body. This is what makes a note on a violin sound
like a violin, and what makes that violin sounds like that violin. Every violin is unique,
and instrument makers and acousticians alike study the material properties of woods,
varnishes, animal and metal strings, bow designs, rosin types, and other material
constituents of the instrument, as well as the acoustic impacts of differences in ambient
temperature, humidity, and air pressure. Nonetheless, violins tend to sound like violins,
and the notes they produce different sounds than notes in the same register produced by
other instruments: a violin does not sound like a piano, or a flute, or a tuning fork.
There is an apparent incompatibility between the model of the violin’s sound
transmission and the model of the string’s harmonics. Holding the endpoints of the
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vibrating string fixed is necessary to generate a standing wave, as discussed extensively
above. However, holding the endpoints of a violin string fixed is also antithetical to
deriving explanations from the transmission model: if the end of the violin string that
touches the bridge is fixed and still, the violin is silent—without a moving bridge, there
is no vibration to communicate to the sound post, sound board, instrument body, or into
the air beyond. The two models contributing to an explanation of violin acoustics are, it
appears, incompatible, despite that both are fundamentally about the production of
sound waves.
Resolving this apparent incompatibility is a crucial step in developing a theory of
explanation. Similar problems have been encountered elsewhere in explanation in
physics, and philosophers of science have developed a variety of coping mechanisms: one
model of the system might be reduced to the other, or one might turn out to emerge
from the other as a limiting case, so that the two models on which the explanations are
based are no longer competing over the same explanandum. The problem with this
approach is that reductive and emergent strategies for linking models or theories
together typically rely on some kind of separation along the length, time, or energy
scales involved in the component models, so that it is possible to cleave one model off
from another. In modeling a violin’s acoustics, however, there is no meaningful
distinction between the length, time, and energy scales involved in the waves described
by the harmonics model and those described in the structural model of the violin’s
soundbox. The problem isn’t one that can be easily resolved by separation of levels or
scales. In a similar vein, there is no obvious ordering of the two models along the
dimension of fundamentality. The harmonics explanation is not about a more
fundamental piece of the sound production than the vibration-transmission explanation,
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nor vice versa. But if the two explanations are about the same thing, and if they are
both essential to understanding violin acoustics, then there should be some way to
reconcile the two—especially since the models that generate these explanations are in
fact often pooled together in physical explanations of violin acoustics.
The resolution, I believe, lies in the role of the fixed endpoint as a boundary
condition on the model of the string’s harmonics. In performing the second and third
explanatory functions identified above, the fixed endpoint of the harmonic model is
essential in generating explanations of the violin’s harmonics. However, it is a point of
fact that the boundary at the bridge end of the violin simply is not genuinely fixed: it
wiggles around, and is designed specifically to do so, and it does so in a way that
transmits vibrations from the bridge through the various parts of the violin and out into
the world. What fixing the endpoint in the harmonic model does is to idealize away the
wiggling, so that it is possible to produce a model of the string’s behavior that
successfully generates the harmonic relations of interest. Holding the endpoint fixed in
the model is an example of Wilson’s physics avoidance, in which the complicated
dynamics of the actual points of contact between the string and the bridge are
suppressed in order to enable the production of patterns of behavior in the model. Once
those patterns of behavior—i.e., the harmonics—are obtained from the harmonic model,
it is possible to export them into the model of sound transmission.
A small aside may prove useful. How information can be transmitted across multiple
models in a multi-model explanation is a subject of significant recent philosophical
interest, particularly as it pertains to the construction of multiscale models (e.g. as in
Winsberg 2010; Green and Batterman 2017; Bursten 2018; Jhun, Forthcoming). In a
recent article on multiscale modeling, for instance, I argued that the use of a multiscale
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model is only justified to the extent that the “conceptual strategies” connecting the
component models in the multiscale model are justified (Bursten 2018). These strategies
draw on a combination of mathematical, theoretical, and empirical background
information to rationalize a particular way of stitching multiple component models
together. The model-connecting function of boundary conditions illustrated here may be
understood as a type of such a conceptual strategy. Acknowledging that setting the
boundary condition in the harmonic model is an instance of physics avoidance provides
justification for exporting harmonic phenomena into the transmission model. This is
itself an instance of Bokulich’s justificatory step in constructing model-explanations.
Treating the contact between the violin’s string and bridge as a fixed endpoint, and
modeling it as a reduced-dimension boundary condition, are elements in the construction
of a conceptual bridge between the harmonics and transmission models.
The specification of a boundary, and the encoding of that boundary into a boundary
condition on a mathematical model, are nearly universal preconditions for the generation
of explanations in the physical sciences. Further, there are plenty of domains of physics
that require careful study of how certain features of a system are represented sometimes
as boundary conditions, and sometimes as robust physical behaviors with internal
mechanics of their own. The technique of idealizing away complex behavior at material
boundaries by parameterizing that behavior is a crucial step in building successful
multiscale models and resolving the problem of the tyranny of scales, as discussed by
Batterman, Rob Phillips, and others. (Phillips 2001; Oden et al. 2006; Batterman 2012)
Indeed, it may be the case that most, if not all, explanations in physics that employ
multiscale models rely essentially on the use of boundary conditions to coordinate among
theoretical backgrounds. Even mechanistic explanations, in which impulses are
33
D
RA
FT
transmitted from one part of a system to another, need a story about how the force from
one billiard ball produces motion in a second ball, and the microphysics of such
interactions must be reconciled with the macroscopic notion of a perfectly elastic
collision.
To return to the account being developed here, the final explanatory function of
boundary conditions is to coordinate different models, often with distinct theoretical
backgrounds, into a single explanation. I have illustrated this connective function
through the example of violin acoustics, but a similar story could be told about the
production of explanations that employ both Navier-Stokes and boundary-layer flow
models in fluid mechanics, and across a variety of other contexts, as well. This function
is distinct from the first three in that it occurs only in the construction of explanations
that employ multiple models, rather than being applicable to either single-model or
multiple-model explanations.
5 Conclusions
The four explanatory functions of boundary conditions share a few common features:
they articulate distinctive roles for boundary conditions in the project of constructing
physical explanations from models, and those roles are derived from what I have called
the structure-specifying way of understanding boundary conditions, rather than the
variable-fixing way of understanding them. In explicating these explanatory roles I have
occasionally explicitly distinguished between attributing an explanatory fact or feature
to a boundary condition as opposed to a law. However, in other places—for instance, in
the explanation of the transmission model of a violin’s sound production—laws have
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been left largely out of the developing picture. The four functions are meant to exist in a
compatbilist pluralism with one another: as seen in the examples given, some individual
roles for boundary conditions occupy multiple functions, and not every function is
instantiated in each application of a boundary condition to the development of an
explanation.
My motivating aim in articulating this account has been to argue against the two
Hempelian theses about the role of boundary conditions in physical explanations, largely
because these theses have been persistent in the philosophy of science and pernicious to
our understanding of explanation. The picture I have painted is one of boundary
conditions as components of models that can set the scope of lawlike claims, rationalize
the existence of stable behavior in the interior of modeled physical systems, generate
phenomena with explanatory value, and coordinate between models with differing
theoretical backgrounds. This picture is intended as substantial evidence against the
second Hempelian thesis, namely that laws always play the more central role in physical
explanation.
Part of this evidence comes from the substantial, irreducible, and varied functions of
boundary conditions in the sorts of explanations I consider here, but another bulk of the
evidence comes from the argument contained in Section 3, which offered reasons to reject
the conception of boundary conditions as the non-lawlike components of explanations. I
closed that section with a discussion point that is important enough that it merits
restating here: The role of contingent facts in scientific explanation is an important
subject to be able to reference in philosophical discussions of explanation, but it is a
mistake to refer to that subject by talking about the boundary conditions, or
initial-and-boundary-conditions, of a system. Doing so invokes the variable-fixing, rather
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than the structure-specifying, conception of boundary conditions, which is the wrong one
to attend in considering the function of boundary conditions in physical models. It also
has the consequence of steering attention away from the varied and complex functions of
boundary conditions in physical explanation. To paraphrase Butterfield, variable-fixing
is a matter of mere happenstance, in some sense that structure-specifying is not.
There is a more limited sense in which some contingent properties of materials may
be represented by or interpreted as initial conditions in some physical models, insofar as
initial conditions specify the state of affairs at the outset of the evolution of a dynamical
system. This constitutes evidence against Thesis (1), since initial conditions can be
understood as occupying some of the same conceptual territory as contingent facts.
However, just as boundary conditions are well-defined mathematical objects, so are
initial conditions; likewise, just as boundary-value problems carve out a host of
interesting challenges for physical modeling and its epistemology, so may initial-value
problems. I have not conducted a study on initial conditions to parallel the present
considerations on boundary conditions, but it seems evident that initial conditions will
not function to rationalize stable behavior, generate phenomena, nor coordinate models
in the same manner as boundary conditions. That said, they may, in some sense, limit
scope in a parallel fashion.
However, important distinctions remain between initial conditions and boundary
conditions. Unlike initial conditions, boundary conditions place enduring constraints on
the behavior of wave and fluid systems, fixing the spatial regions where the laws will
apply. It is not just the wave equation, but instead the paired team of the wave equation
coupled with fixed endpoints, that drives explanations of harmonics. The notion of
reflection through a boundary point is crucial to the generation of a standing wave;
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remove it, and the only options left to the wave are propagation and dissipation, neither
of which will produce a violin’s note. In modeling the evolution of a standing wave, the
initial condition specifies the amplitude and the location of the initial traveling wave,
which resolves into the standing wave once it reflects through the fixed boundary points.
True enough, differences in initial conditions can impact the amplitude and harmonic
ordinal of the resulting wave, but it does not constrain the possible frequencies of the
standing wave. To put the point in terms of the violin example, an open A string will
always play A as its fundamental tone, no matter whether it is bowed heavily or lightly,
next to the bridge or up on the neck of the instrument. The boundary endures, and with
it, the boundary conditions on the mathematical model. This indicates that there is a
meaningful difference between the explanatory roles of initial conditions, on the one
hand, and of boundary conditions, on the other.
Taken together, these observations are intended as a corrective to the canonical
philosophical use of the term “boundary condition” in discussions of scientific
explanation. Boundary conditions are mathematical objects that are components of
models in physics. They serve at least four distinct explanatory functions: scope-setting,
law-stabilizing, phenomena-generating, and model-coordinating. These functions are not
mutually exclusive, and more work remains to be done in articulating how the different
functions relate to one another. Nonetheless, the functions can be slotted into a variety
of contemporary accounts of explanation, and they are particularly apt for use in
accounts of model-based explanation, where they can be interpreted as supporting the
generation of explanatory patterns in models. Finally, to mistake boundary conditions
for contingent facts is, at best, a bad joke.
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